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A public health approach to gambling regulation: 
countering powerful influences 
May C I van Schalkwyk, Mark Petticrew, Rebecca Cassidy, Peter Adams, Martin McKee, Jennifer Reynolds, Jim Orford
Often portrayed as a harmless leisure activity in the UK, gambling is being increasingly recognised as a public health 
concern. However, a gambling policy system that explicitly tackles public health concerns and confronts the 
dependencies and conflicts of interest that undermine the public good is absent in the UK. Although there is a window 
of opportunity to change the gambling policy system, with the UK Government’s launch of a review of the Gambling 
Act 2005, the adoption of a comprehensive and meaningful public health approach is not guaranteed. Too often, 
government policy has employed discourses that align more closely with those of the gambling industry than with 
those of the individuals, families, and communities affected by the harms of gambling. In view of the well described 
commercial determinants of health and corporate behaviour, an immense effort will be needed to shift the gambling 
discourse to protect public health. In this Viewpoint, we seek to advance this agenda by identifying elements that need 
challenging and stimulating debate.
The challenge ahead 
Often portrayed as a harmless pastime in the UK, 
gambling is increasingly being recognised as a public 
health concern.1 Historically, when gambling was dis­
cussed in the medical literature, it was in the context of 
small numbers of pathological gamblers.2 This scenario 
changed in the 1990s, when gambling began to be viewed 
through a public health lens;3,4 looking beyond the 
individual to the role of gambling products and gambling’s 
wider determinants, and placing the risks of a range of 
health and social harms on a continuum, rather than, as 
previously, a dichotomy between the harmless and the 
pathological. However, although some countries formally 
recognise gambling as a public health issue, recognition 
does not always translate into action. No jurisdiction has 
yet created a gambling regulatory system that explicitly 
tackles public health concerns and confronts the depen­
dencies and conflicts of interest that undermine the public 
good while embracing gambling liberalisation.5 There is a 
window of opportunity to change gambling regulation in 
the UK because the Government launched, in 2020, a 
review of the Gambling Act 2005, which will affect 
England, Scotland, and Wales.6 However, that trans­
formational change will happen is far from certain, and 
current efforts to adopt a public health response risk being 
ineffective at best and counterproductive at worst. This 
risk is, to a considerable extent, due to a failure to gain 
traction in the policy arena with a convincing argument 
for adopting a public health approach. In this Viewpoint, 
we define a public health approach as one based on 
collective action to advance the public good by promoting 
health, equity, and social justice, and by adopting a broad 
and population­level perspective to gambling harms.7 
Achieving this approach will, in part, require the public 
health community to engage fully with this issue, 
advancing counter­discourses to those that have become 
common, while recognising that policy and social change 
are complex and context­dependent.8 Gambling discourses 
have long been dominated by individualised and often 
pathologised understandings that serve to maintain the 
status quo and that marginalise and conceal broader 
societal perspectives, such as the harmful effects of 
gambling products and gambling environments.9–14 For 
more than 20 years, UK Government policy has portrayed 
gambling as, firstly, enjoyable; secondly, an expression of 
adult freedom; and, lastly, harmful only to a minority. Too 
often, the UK Government and policy makers have 
employed discourses that align more closely with those of 
the gambling industry than with those of the individuals, 
families, and communities affected by the harms of 
gambling.6,10,12 This discourse is also reproduced by much 
research on gambling, a substantial proportion of which is 
funded by the industry and done in academic partnerships, 
and by industry­funded responses, such as individualised 
education and treatment. In this way, an international 
gambling evidence base that is narrow in scope, often 
methodologically weak, and that focuses on problematising 
individuals while deflecting attention from harmful pro­
ducts, industry practices, and the effects of liberalisation 
has emerged.13,15–19
These developments have created, in the UK, one of the 
most liberal gambling markets in the world,7,10,12 supervised 
by a regulatory system that oversight bodies fear does not 
to have the capacity or the data to regulate the industry in 
the public interest.20,21 This policy system has promoted 
self­regulation and industry­regulator partnerships as 
stan dard.10,12 Of note, the review of the Act is being led by 
the Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport,6 
unlike the England tobacco control plan22 and obesity 
strategy,23 for example, which are both overseen by the 
Department of Health and Social Care.
This review process must be seen in the context of 
decades of evidence documenting the ways in which 
corporations act to establish and maintain products and 
regulatory environments that are favourable to their 
interests. When industries selling highly profitable, yet 
harmful, products (eg, tobacco, alcohol, opioids, and oil) 
are faced with clear evidence of the resulting harms, the 
threat of government regulation, and declining public 
legitimacy, one of their first moves has repeatedly been to 
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cast doubt on the science, distorting the evidence base 
to influence the public discourse, delay regulation, and 
restore their legitimacy.24,25 Everything that is known about 
corporate behaviour suggests that a monumental effort 
will be necessary to shift the discourse, but, as described 
by Livingstone and Rintoul,8 there are alternatives avail­
able that accurately reflect the current state of knowledge 
about gambling harms. Drawing on the literature docu­
menting the commercial determinants of health and 
public health policy, we seek to identify informative and 
important elements of the UK gambling policy discourse 
that need to be challenged, thereby opening spaces for 
debate and supporting the aims of other initiatives, such 
as the Lancet Public Health Commission on gambling.26
Reclaiming the evidence debate 
The tobacco industry has long sought to capture the 
discourse on the evidence on smoking and health. This 
effort includes casting doubt on the evidence of harm, 
generating a parallel evidence base that fuels uncertainty 
in the minds of the public and policy makers, and 
manipulating scientific concepts to impose unrealistic 
standards of proof. The industry thus seeks to delay 
regulation, avoid litigation, promote ineffective interven­
tions, and blame consumers for any harm.25,27,28 Access to 
internal industry documents enabled an understanding of 
these strategies, which are also adopted by many other 
industries.16,24,25 The nature of the evidence is also central 
to gambling policy debates. Like the tobacco and alcohol 
industries, gambling corporations in communication 
with receptive governments have established a double 
standard, whereby evidence­based interventions that 
threaten their business model must meet exceptionally 
stringent criteria of proof, whereas industry­sponsored so­
called responsible gambling interventions of dubious 
value—many reminiscent of the Drink Responsibly 
messaging and similar approaches adopted by the tobacco 
industry—are accepted without question.10 In submissions 
to the 2013 Australian Parliamentary Sports Betting 
Advertising inquiry, the industry distorted the evidence 
about the extent and nature of gambling harms and the 
effects of their activities, selectively presenting evidence, 
omitting crucial findings, and allowing unsubstantiated 
claims to be made.29 In doing so, they could draw on the 
body of gambling research, much characterised by 
conflicts of interest, which has pathologised so­called 
deviant individuals.10–13,16,30 This depiction recalls the 
tobacco industry’s support for genetic research as part of a 
decades­long strategy to find explanations for disease 
among smokers that were not related to their pro­
ducts.10,14,16,31–33 In reality, the evidence on interventions and 
treatments to prevent gambling harms, including youth 
education programmes, is generally weak, of individual 
level, and has short follow­up periods.16,17,34 Yet, despite 
their insistence on a high level of proof before adopting 
regulations,35 UK betting firms and their leading trade 
body heavily promote their £10 million investment in 
youth programmes.35–37 There is little reason to believe that 
such programmes would work, given findings that a 
similar approach promoted extensively by the tobacco and 
alcohol industries has been ineffective or counter­
productive (and might even, at times, be designed to fail, 
or be strategically ambiguous).38,39
As with other industries marketing harmful products, 
gambling corporations exploit the often indirect causal 
pathways linking their activities to disease.10,16,40 Gambling 
poses several challenges because exposure or use, as well 
as harms to individuals, families, and communities, are 
difficult to measure and quantify, take a range of forms, 
and are constantly changing. The harms of gambling on 
individuals, families, and communities often represent 
co­occurring problems, afflicting many people who 
are already in vulnerable circumstances, exacerbating 
precarious and challeng ing lives, and hindering their 
attempts to overcome adversity.7 Gambling harms extend 
well beyond high­intensity relationships such as problem 
gambling,41 affect ing families and communities, often 
with devastating consequences, including job loss, 
violence, relationship breakdown, suicide, education 
disruption, or homelessness. As with similar complex 
public health challenges, Sulkunen and colleagues7 
explain that the relationship between gambling and 
harm is better conceptualised as “con ditional causation” 
reflecting how “problems occur in combination with 
multiple factors reinforcing one another in a conditional 
relationship”.
The evidence base to inform policies that can prevent 
gambling harms is developing,7,8 but there is already 
enough to argue that many of the established methods to 
counter other harmful but legal products (eg, tobacco and 
alcohol)—restricting access, availability, and advertising, 
and denormalisation and evidence­based counter­
marketing—can be used to guide interventions to prevent 
gambling harms.8,42–44 These industries have sought to 
delay effective action by citing uncertainty about the 
evidence and thereby justifying inaction.16,24,25,27,28 However, 
as widely accepted in public health,45,46 the unavailability 
of so­called perfect evidence should not legitimise 
inaction; policy change can be informed by the best 
available evidence, which is the basis of the precautionary 
principle.47
Recycling the same arguments to deflect and 
delay 
When faced with the threat of stronger regulations, 
industries invoke a series of familiar arguments to delay 
policy and deflect attention from ongoing harm. One well 
documented argument relates to illicit trade. The tobacco 
industry has long warned that tax increases and 
standardised packaging would encourage this trade.48,49 
However, that the industry based its arguments on 
unreliable data, itself facilitated illicit trade, and sought to 
prevent the adoption of robust, independent systems 
directed at tackling the illicit market are now known 
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facts.50 Critics of minimum unit alcohol pricing similarly 
drew on dubious arguments about illicit trade.51 Now, 
arguments about the illicit or so­called black market have 
entered the UK gambling policy debate, with the industry 
and its leading trade body warning against unintentionally 
driving con sumers to the black market through stricter 
regulations.52 However, in doing so, they have drawn 
heavily on a single report, based mainly on survey and 
internet search data collected over only 3 years. Seasonality 
might have biased the findings, and data from 2018–19 
appear to have been combined and compared with data 
from 2020—clearly an aberrant year due to the 
pandemic.52,53 The Australian gambling industry used a 
similar report that again concluded that restricting online 
gambling would drive a substantial proportion of gamblers 
to unregulated sites.29 Although the black market poses 
risks to children and adolescents, adults, and society,54 
most harm arises from regulated markets.7 Arguments 
invoking the risk of illegal providers also do not reflect the 
more nuanced reality (panel).7,55 An effective strategy to 
reduce gambling harms needs to address the entire 
spectrum of gambling opportunities.
A second argument is centred on the industry’s 
contribution to charitable causes, taxes, and the economy. 
This is something that the tobacco and alcohol industries 
have long invoked, and arguments that have also long ago 
been discredited.55,56 Assertions about the contribution of 
the gambling industry to the economy similarly warrant 
scrutiny. The current policy discourse emphasises the 
industry’s tax contribu tions (approximately £3 billion paid 
to the Her Majesty’s Treasury annually) and role as 
employer of nearly 100 000 people.6 However, this framing 
overlooks the safety risks associated with some of these 
jobs10,14 and the fact that the gambling industry is a so­called 
rent­seeking industry that does not create wealth, but 
rather redistributes it from the deprived and vulnerable, 
including those affected by gambling­related harms, to the 
very rich, extracting money from its customers.19,57 
Furthermore, the phased introduction of public health 
principles into policy change does not inevitably lead to 
mass job losses, as evidenced by the intro duction of stake 
limits on fixed odds betting terminals,58 and employment 
is also likely to be stimulated in other sectors as consumer 
expenditure shifts away from gambling.59–61 In addition, 
despite the UK Government publicly committing to 
“levelling up” society, gambling taxation is highly 
regressive,62 increasingly so as access is broadened.63 These 
limitations have implications for the “build back better” 
post­COVID­19 agenda, which requires a shift away from 
reliance on rent­seeking industries, particularly those 
associated with social costs that undermine resilience at 
the individual, familial, and societal levels.
A third element to be addressed is the concept of 
balance. Both government and the industry argue for the 
need to balance the prevention of harm and the enjoyment 
of those for whom gambling is a harmless leisure 
activity.6,35 However, a public health approach does not 
simply take an average of winners and losers; rather, it 
prioritises social justice and the public good, paying 
particular attention to those who are most at risk of harm. 
It does not simply weigh the disadvantages and gains 
incurred by society as a whole, especially where the 
greatest harms are incurred by the already disadvantaged 
while the benefits accrue to those who are well off.7
A fourth element of the current discourse invokes 
complexity. As with other harmful products, the causal 
chain between a corporate decision, for example, to 
Panel: Types of gambling markets*
Legal or licensed markets
The legal market can be organised in different ways—
for example, through licensing of private interest or 
government monopoly. Each form of legal market has 
advantages and disadvantages. As explained by Sulkunen and 
colleagues,7 what is of concern from a public interest 
perspective is not which regimen is chosen, but how well a 
given arrangement ensures the separation of market 
regulation from economic interests.
Illegal or black markets
Gambling activities that are prohibited by law (eg, so-called 
underground poker clubs, or unlicensed land-based or online 
gambling provision). Banks54 describes three opportunities 
for illegal online gambling: an online gambling provider that 
accepts bets from people in jurisdictions in which online 
gambling is prohibited, a provider that accepts online bets 
placed by underage gamblers, and a provider that operates 
online in the absence of an appropriate licence.
Grey markets
The European Commission makes a distinction between 
so-called black and grey market operators, black representing 
operators who provide unlicensed betting and gaming 
opportunities from EU or non-EU countries, and grey 
(also referred to as the offshore market) representing those 
operators who, although licensed in one or more European 
Economic Area member states, provide gambling 
opportunities to customers in other member states without 
those states’ specific authorisation. Both the black and grey 
markets pose risks to consumers and undermine a given 
state’s ability to regulate online gambling markets.
Shadow markets
Here we introduce what we refer to as the shadow market, 
to capture the development, promotion, and dissemination of 
different forms of so-called stimulated, money-free, practice, 
or demonstration (demo) gambling, which tend not to have 
age restrictions and can therefore be accessed by children and 
adolescents. They can be accessed via online platforms or apps, 
and some are embedded within non-gambling games, 
whereas others are simulated gambling forms of more 
traditional games such as Monopoly.
*The boundaries between these different markets are often blurred.
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promote different gambling opportunities, and the harm 
to individuals, such as suicide, is complex and convoluted 
and there are always other factors involved. This complexity 
is used by the gambling industry to argue against regula­
tion, at the same time as they endorse simple measures to 
address the complex issue of gambling harms.40
Promoting an alternative discourse could be difficult, 
in particular since the gambling industry has invested in 
relationships with politicians, arguably undermining the 
democratic process by exerting hidden influence.10,12,19,64 
The industry and its proponents invoke, and widely 
advertise, the benefits of a liberalised gambling sector, 
for instance through sport sponsorship and contributions 
to charitable causes, which, however, create dependencies 
and conflicts of interest that undermine the public 
interest.5,16,64,65 These arguments ignore how, like the 
alcohol industry,66 a substantial share of the gambling 
industry’s income, and thus its profitability, is derived 
from the heaviest users.63,67 The ethical and business 
impli cations of this “addiction surplus”65 are rarely 
discussed.14,16
Detail matters 
Corporations act to shape public discourses.16,24,25 Those 
charged with promoting public health have a duty to chal­
lenge how current discourses articulate gambling harms 
and potential responses, which will require question ing 
the use of gambling as a catch­all term for what is more 
accurately conceptualised as a complex system of products, 
practices, and agents.18,68 Consequently, a comprehensive 
response needs to consider the unprecedented breadth 
and forms of gambling products; cultural variations in 
gambling experiences; substantial shifts in acceptance, 
accessibility, availability, and aware ness; innovations in 
marketing strategies and reward schemes; the ability to 
track and engage directly with customers; the use of 
personal data mining processes by third­party affiliates 
who can identify and refer those who display problematic 
use, profiting from their future lifetime losses; and the 
role of the industry in providing warnings and information 
and intervening when players display signs of harmful 
consumption.5,7,10,18,53,69
Although we do not dispute that some people view some 
forms of gambling as entertainment, we argue that a 
much greater appreciation of, and debate about, the 
diversity of products, industry practices, and consumer 
experiences is needed. The labelling of gambling as a 
singular leisure activity overlooks this nuanced social 
reality, and potentially mislabels many products that are 
designed to maximise revenue despite the harm that they 
can cause.18 The addictive and harmful nature of gambling 
products and the effectiveness of promotional practices 
should not be underestimated. As documented by Schüll,18 
the design of electronic gaming machines seeks to 
optimise speed, length, and intensity of play, creating 
products that extract maximum revenue per available 
customer. In addition, the use of simple estimates of the 
prevalence of problem gambling and comparisons over 
time are highly problematic and involve misleading 
indicators of harm, and should not form the basis of policy 
making.7,13,70 The claim that only a minority is harmed is 
highly contested by some advocates and researchers in the 
field. Using prevalence within the entire population is 
mis leading; if the denominator is restricted to the 
gambling population or, even more so, to those who 
gamble regularly, a different picture emerges.18 For 
example, Livingstone and Woolley found that over half of 
those who regularly use electronic gaming machines 
either have, or are at risk of, problem gambling.11
Echoing leading tobacco and alcohol scholars,28,71 Orford 
describes how modern gambling products are no ordinary 
commodities; the need for accompanying self­restriction 
tools, player tracking, and treatment facilities being key 
indicators of this fact.12 Public health professionals and 
governments have a duty to reduce the individual and 
social costs arising from any product that can cause 
serious harm to individuals, families, and communities. 
The industry cannot be expected to adopt measures that 
might curb profits, as is assumed by policies based on 
self­regulation.72 Transformational, bold, and innovative 
policy change, guided by the best available evidence and 
principles of health, equity, and social justice is essential 
to creating a UK gambling regulatory regimen that 
prevents and minimises harm, is adaptive and proactive 
as markets and products change, and is shaped by 
democratic processes that welcome public voices, 
particularly those affected by gambling harms. Meaningful 
policy change will need to reflect the scale and nature of 
gambling harms. This change will require attending to 
the complexity of the interplay between industry practices, 
products, policy, effects on the population, the inequitable 
distribution of harms and benefits, and the public health 
and ethical issues created by the networks of influence, 
dependencies, and conflicts of interest. The scale of this 
change and the barriers that will need to be overcome 
should not be underestimated. However, the commitment 
and desire for change is evident within many communities 
worldwide. The wider health community can add their 
voice and expertise to support this agenda, recognising 
that gambling policy change in the name of public health 
and social justice is realisable, and that ongoing harms 
and harmful products, practices, policies, and partnerships 
can no longer be overlooked or tolerated.
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